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The Potential of Weather Index Insurance for Spurring a 
Green Revolution in Africa 
Jerry  R.  Skees  and  Benjamin  Collier  
Innovation in index insurance products to transfer weather risks is capturing the attention of the 
development community. The use of index insurance can be documented in about twenty-five 
countries. Two noteworthy projects in Africa demonstrate the scope of the potential applications 
of these new products. The Ethiopia drought insurance for food security targets funding 
emergency food aid for an international organization and was purchased by the World Food 
Programme (WFP) in 2006. The ongoing Malawi pilot program encourages lending and 
adoption of improved technology among smallholder groundnut farmers. The World Bank, GTZ, 
and others are actively engaged at some stage of development in several other African nations 
(e.g., Senegal, Tanzania, Kenya, Morocco, Mali, etc.).1 While these activities are promising, 
developing sustainable weather insurance products will not be easy. Numerous constraints 
must be addressed: 1) data limitations; 2) inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks; 3) 
insufficient ex ante financing for insuring largely correlated risks; and 4) limited delivery systems 
for smallholders. In addition, there is a need for capacity building for insurance companies and 
educational efforts for potential buyers. 
The quest for a green revolution in Africa depends principally upon the development and 
adoption of appropriate agricultural technologies. While there are many impediments to the 
adoption of technology, the economic development literature is clear in citing risk as being a 
dominant constraint. Poor households must be conservative in the choices they make as they 
can ill-afford to make significant investments in new technologies only to experience dramatic 
income shortfalls due to perils such as crop failure or low prices.2 This aversion to risk causes 
poor households to engage in livelihood strategies that reduce risk but also greatly limit income 
potential. Thus, risk contributes to locking the poor into poverty. At a more aggregate level, risk 
constrains economic growth because society’s resources are not directed to their highest and 
best use, which further constrains economic opportunities at the household level. Thus, the 
realization of a green revolution in Africa is dependent not only on the development of 
appropriate technologies but also on the development of effective risk transfer instruments that 
will facilitate technology adoption by the poor. Such risk transfer instruments can contribute to 
meeting the dual objectives of poverty reduction and economic growth. 
1 Annex A is reproduced with permission from the World Bank. Annex A reviews some ongoing activities in price and weather risk 
management in eastern and southern Africa.  
2 Throughout this manuscript the term “poor” refers to households with very limited assets (including household labor) that can be 
employed in income-generating livelihood strategies. These households should be distinguished from those that are destitute, in the 
sense that they do not possess sufficient assets to even maintain nutritional subsistence. The focus here is on households that are 
not destitute but are seemingly locked into low-income, low-consumption thresholds. Thus, the interventions discussed here focus 
on stimulating investment and asset accumulation. Households that are quite literally destitute require very different types of 
interventions. 
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This paper focuses on the potential of index-based weather insurance products for contributing 
to a green revolution in Africa3. We begin by building a conceptual framework that links poverty, 
risk, and missing financial markets. Next, we present the case for why weather risk transfer and 
agricultural insurance can contribute to development. We then review the fundamental problems 
with traditional agricultural insurance products, which motivated efforts to develop alternatives 
such as index-based insurance products. Still, as we will demonstrate, there are numerous 
preconditions for making index insurance workable. Considering these preconditions in practice 
— which constraints can be overcome and which ones cannot — led to the development of our 
business model, which outlines the steps needed to develop sustainable weather insurance 
markets. 
Both the conceptual discussion of index-based insurance and the pragmatic suggestions of how 
to develop these markets provide a foundation for analyzing four distinct products that we 
believe may be applicable in various parts of Africa. The weather risks that most affect African 
nations are drought and flooding.4 Index insurance for drought is currently much further 
developed than index insurance for other perils. Thus, most of the focus in this paper is on 
drought. Nonetheless, our experience working with flood risk in Peru and Vietnam also 
motivates our thinking about index insurance. 
For household-level products, we focus in this paper primarily, though not exclusively, on poor 
households engaged in smallholder agriculture. Smallholder households dominate the rural 
African landscape. But it becomes clear that if the smallholder market can be reached, larger-
scale farming operations can also be served. We use the Malawi case study to focus on one 
class of household-level products that is well-integrated into the value chain with the specific 
goal of giving farmers loans to adopt new technology. While the intent of this product is very 
sound, the implementation and data constraints make it difficult to replicate. We also review is 
the WFP drought product that was designed to pay at the country level when drought creates 
food security problems. In this case study, we provide some additional ideas about how this 
class of food security products could be targeted at the sub-region level to provide timely 
resources to mitigate emerging food security problems. Given the implementation and data 
constraints, and building on the Malawi experience, we introduce other products that could be 
targeted at smallholder households and intermediaries in a fashion that encourages technology 
adoption. The review of existing products and the ideas we present lead to recommendations 
for how to advance the development process of weather index insurance products in Africa, 
including ideas for how donor and other public support can be most effectively used to spur 
market development for weather index insurance in Africa.  
3 Given the importance of price risk management, we also include Annex B, which reviews how and when price risk management 
instruments can be used for food security issues.  
4 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
Weather Shocks, Poverty, Risk, Economic Growth, and 
Missing Markets 
 
 
 
The Potential of Weather Index Insurance for Spurring a Green Revolution in Africa 
Jerry R. Skees and Benjamin Collier, GlobalAgRisk, Inc. 
3
                                                     
Weather Shocks, Poverty, Risk, Economic Growth, and Missing Markets 
Though many factors contribute to lagging development in Africa — poor institutions, civil 
unrest, geographic difficulties, etc. — natural disasters remain a significant impediment to 
growth in many African nations. Natural disasters are particularly problematic in Africa because 
so many households rely on agriculture for their livelihoods.  
Poverty Traps and Livelihood Strategies 
When a weather shock occurs, it can affect most or even all the livelihood strategies of poor 
households. A drought can devastate a farmer’s crops. Extreme weather events can override 
the improved agricultural productivity promised by technologies, such as drought-resistant plant 
varieties, irrigation systems, hardier livestock, etc., but the damage does not stop there. To 
manage risk, poor households tend to diversify labor across a variety of activities. For example, 
in some regions livestock are kept both as a source of income and a form of savings. The 
landless or those with limited access to land may depend on income (paid either in cash or in-
kind) from harvesting crops for someone else in the community. The well-being of those earning 
incomes from farming activities also often depends on off-farm jobs. However, diversifying 
household labor across these various livelihood strategies will not significantly reduce income 
risk if all of the strategies are negatively affected by widespread (correlated) weather 
catastrophes such as drought. Furthermore, if everyone in the community suffers from the same 
catastrophic event, traditional risk coping strategies that involve reciprocity or principles of 
informal mutual insurance may also break down. When a widespread disaster occurs, few 
households are in a position to help their neighbors. Distressed sales of livestock during 
droughts create significant downward pressure on prices because many households sell 
livestock at the same time. Left with no other choice, some households may have to resort to 
selling livelihood assets, reducing consumption, taking children out of school to either work or to 
save on school costs, etc. All of these strategies can lead to chronic poverty as they reduce 
current and/or future opportunities for generating income. As a result, shocks can plunge 
households into permanent poverty or they can keep knocking households down preventing 
them from growing out of poverty.5 
Regretfully, these poverty dynamics are repeated constantly across the African continent. To 
repeat, these dynamics hurt both the individual household and the overall economy. The ex post 
impacts of a major shock like a drought or flood are quite obvious. Such events can knock 
individual households into poverty, from which they may never recover. However, it is critical 
that policy makers also recognize the ex ante impacts of shocks. If the risk of such shocks 
cannot be effectively transferred using instruments like insurance, households will engage in 
behavioral responses that impede technology adoption and wealth accumulation. For example, 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) estimate the opportunity costs of the low-risk, low-return 
livelihood choices of Indian farmers and found that implicit premium rates (in the form of 
5 To ease the flow of this paper, in text citations are kept to a minimum. For further reading suggestions, please see the 
Recommended Readings list, organized by topic and by case study countries. For example, relevant material for this section can be 
found in the Recommended Readings topic section, Poverty Traps, Risk Coping, and Risk Management Strategies Used by the 
Working Poor. 
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foregone opportunities to earn higher incomes) exceeded 30 percent. In the aggregate, the 
impact of these household-level decisions is slower economic growth. 
While the economic foundations for understanding how risk negatively influences technological 
adoption, development, and poverty are well-established, only recently have economists taken 
the logical next step to argue that the failure of financial markets compounds the problems that 
are created by risk. High transaction costs severely limit the access of the poor to financial 
services (including risk transfer) and global markets, resulting in suboptimal risk coping 
strategies. Credit, savings, and insurance markets are largely missing in rural areas of lower 
income countries. Each of these financial markets provides opportunities for smoothing incomes 
across loss events. With such opportunities, household decision makers can take on more risk, 
including the adoption of new technology. Increasing evidence indicates that lower income 
countries that have both strong banking and insurance sectors grow faster than countries with 
only a banking sector.  
Correlated Risk and Intermediaries 
The risk and poverty dynamics we describe have clear implications for the risk faced by any 
intermediary trying to deliver inputs and/or financial services to the poor. Spatially correlated risk 
constrains the delivery of services to the poor. 
The role of intermediaries as providers of inputs and financial services to smallholder rural 
households in developing countries is critical if these households are to have access to global 
markets. An increasing concern is that poor households are bypassed as multinational firms 
make direct linkages with the largest producers in developing countries. Many factors explain 
this — high transaction costs, information asymmetries, and risk. Thus, midsized intermediaries 
seem to be the primary agents for linking smallholders to larger markets. 
Despite the opportunity to reduce transaction costs by delivering multiple services, midsized 
intermediaries must still deal with correlated risk problems that often limit business investments 
and opportunities in rural areas. While due diligence practices of small and intermediate firms 
have improved, many of these advances ignore the inherent risks largely outside the control of 
the firm-level decision maker. For example, those intermediaries offering credit to households 
involved in small-scale farming must be concerned with underwriting the individual integrity of 
the household in paying back the debt. However, they must also be concerned with events that 
are outside the control of the household, such as weather risks, large downward movements in 
commodity prices, or adverse movements in currency exchanges that affect global 
competitiveness. Such correlated risks have a major influence on the revenue stream from 
farming activities and thus on the revenue stream for firms supplying inputs or financial services 
to those farm households. 
Spatially correlated risks are almost impossible to cope with at the local level as nearly 
everyone within the community may be affected by the same event.6 Similarly, when a large 
number of customers experience a severe reduction in cash flow or agricultural output at the 
6 This is why more familiar risk-coping strategies among households in the same community are largely ineffective against spatially 
correlated loss events. 
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same time, the intermediaries providing services to farmers will also be adversely affected. This 
is particularly problematic for the midsized intermediaries that service smallholder farmers since 
these intermediaries tend to be geographically concentrated and thus cannot spread correlated 
risk across space. For example, if a microfinance institution (MFI) is geographically isolated, a 
single disaster can challenge its solvency. Thus, MFIs either choose to ration credit to 
businesses that are exposed to the same correlated loss events (such as agriculture) or rely on 
international donors to recapitalize the MFI in the event of a correlated catastrophic loss event. 
The former reduces technology adoption and slows economic growth. The latter is clearly an 
unsustainable business practice.  
If midsize input and product market intermediaries are to compete, they must be able to transfer 
their exposure to correlated risk out of the local area. A consequence of this is that, should such 
risk transfer markets emerge, intermediaries may be more willing to serve some areas that are 
now underserved. Therefore, innovation in risk transfer is also an important component of 
developing input and product market intermediaries in lower income countries. The use of 
index-based weather insurance, futures markets, or other risk transfer mechanisms, can be 
critical to reducing risk exposure and making it possible for input and product market 
intermediaries to offer services to smallholder farmers. If there are no mechanisms for risk 
transfer, the risk may preclude development of such services.  
Relief Efforts 
At the macro level, regional disasters translate into large government costs in terms of disaster 
relief, rebuilding efforts, and lost tax revenues. Given the lack of financial services for most rural 
households in Africa, properly functioning safety net programs play a vital role in maintaining 
long-term household productivity when weather shocks occur. Of course, such safety net 
programs will not work for those who are already in chronic poverty; other social solutions are 
needed for the poorest of the poor. Absent financial instruments such as insurance, households 
that experience shocks often are forced to liquidate productive assets in order to maintain even 
minimal levels of consumption. Safety net programs are designed to provide timely interventions 
that forestall the need for liquidating productive assets. Still, disasters result in high opportunity 
costs for governments and donors. While national-level crises often gain media attention and 
assistance from the international community, unpublicized regional-level crises may have the 
biggest impact on the budgets of governments and local donors. Especially when disasters 
occur relatively commonly, such as with drought in some African nations, these costs result in 
constant interruptions to government and donor development agendas including programs that 
improve agricultural productivity. Thus, many governments and donors could potentially benefit 
from purchasing index insurance products that would pay an indemnity in the wake of a 
widespread natural disaster. 
In sum, natural disaster risk hinders economic development at all levels — micro, meso, and 
macro. Thus, for households, intermediaries, governments, and donors, developing effective 
market mechanisms for transferring natural disaster risk is key to stimulating technology 
adoption and long-term economic growth. 
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Recent Developments in Insurance Markets to Transfer Weather Risk 
Despite a clear need and some strong arguments for why weather and agricultural insurance is 
important for economic development, the struggle to find appropriate agricultural insurance 
solutions for lower income countries has been long and arduous. In the 1970s and 1980s, many 
donors worked to resolve this problem only to abandon the efforts due to the classic problems 
that plague agricultural insurance: 
1. Moral hazard 
2. Adverse selection 
3. Correlated risk and potentially large financial losses 
4. High monitoring cost 
5. High delivery cost 
6. High loss adjustment cost 
7. Smallholder farms that exacerbate the high per-unit costs for farm-level products 
The seminal work by Hazell, Pomareda, and Valdés (1986) demonstrates that traditional 
solutions to crop insurance are far too expensive to offset the benefits. Since the mid-1990s, 
scholars have focused on new approaches that trigger indemnity payments based on the value 
of an underlying index.7 This work has renewed the interest of donors in the potential for 
insurance in rural areas of lower income countries. As a result, a number of pilot programs that 
use index insurance for agricultural losses are now underway (e.g., India, Malawi, Ethiopia, 
Mongolia, and Mexico).8 
Index insurance is significantly different from traditional insurance in that the indemnity 
payments are based on data that is outside the influence of the insured. The index is created 
using data that serve as a proxy for loss, eliminating the need for costly individual loss 
assessments. The index is based on an objective measure such as rainfall, livestock mortality, 
county yields, temperature, water levels in a river, etc. These measures should be highly 
correlated with the economic losses (crop failure, death of livestock, loan defaults, etc.) that 
might be experienced by an insured entity but (unlike the actual loss) the insured has no ability 
to affect the index. 
As an example, consider a drought index insurance contract that pays an indemnity anytime 
that cumulative rainfall during a critical two month period of the growing season is less than 100 
millimeters. Indemnity payments would increase proportionately as the measure of rainfall 
declines until a pre-specified limit is reached. For example, the maximum indemnity will be paid 
whenever cumulative rainfall is less than or equal to 50 millimeters. In this example, the contract 
is said to have a threshold (or strike) of 100 millimeters and a limit of 50 millimeters. For 
7 Early work on an area-based index insurance (the Group Risk Plan in the United States) that uses the index of county yields 
(rather than farm-level yields) as the mechanism for indemnity payments led the way for a renewal of interest in revisiting 
agricultural insurance by the World Bank in the mid 1990s (see Recommended Readings topic section, Group Risk Plan). Please 
refer to Recommended Readings topic section, Index Insurance for Lower Income Countries, to learn more about the background, 
motivation, and uses of index insurance.  
8 Further readings for each case study can be found in the Recommended Readings section by country. 
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simplicity, assume the insured purchases a sum insured of $1,000. The payment rate for every 
1 millimeter of rainfall deficit below 100 millimeters is calculated as (100 − 50)/$1000 or $20. 
Thus, if cumulative rainfall over the period were equal to 90 millimeters (or 10 millimeters less 
than the threshold) the indemnity would be 10 x $20 = $200. 
Among the many advantages of index insurance are 1) low moral hazard and adverse selection; 
2) no expensive loss adjustment for small units; 3) potentially less complex data requirements; 
and 4) potentially less complex and more transparent contracts. Nonetheless, index insurance 
can have a significant limitation — basis risk — when individuals have loss and do not get paid, 
or, they have no loss and receive payment. Additionally, data systems may not be adequate to 
develop the most desirable index insurance contracts. Finally, as weather represents a 
correlated risk, it is also critical that the potential large losses associated with writing weather 
index insurance be addressed from the outset and should be done in collaboration with the 
global reinsurance markets. 
Evaluating the Potential for Weather Index Insurance  
There are a number of preconditions for creating sustainable weather index insurance, 
including: 1) exposure to one or more spatially correlated weather events that can generate 
catastrophic losses; 2) historical data regarding the weather event(s) of sufficient quantity and 
quality; 3) local capacity for delivering insurance contracts; 4) a supportive legal and regulatory 
environment; 5) effective market demand for the insurance product at prices that will be 
acceptable to insurance suppliers; and 6) access to risk sharing partners such as global 
reinsurers. 
The first two preconditions can be evaluated via a risk assessment. The third and fourth 
preconditions require an evaluation of the local institutional structure. In many lower income 
countries investments in technical assistance will be required before these two preconditions 
can be met. Later, we discuss the legal and regulatory environment in some detail. There are a 
number of reasons why weather index insurance should be developed as insurance products 
rather than weather derivatives in lower income countries. The major reason is that there is 
generally a framework for regulating insurance products, whereas lower income countries have 
very limited experience regulating derivatives products. 
A market demand analysis is required to evaluate the fifth precondition. There is no reason to 
invest resources in developing an insurance product if it is unlikely that there will be significant 
market demand. The final precondition is largely conditional on the other preconditions. If they 
are to share the risk on the insurance product, reinsurers must be convinced that the underlying 
risk exposure has been accurately assessed, the local institutional structure is adequate to 
support the insurance market, and there is effective demand for the product. 
Significant investments are required to evaluate these preconditions, provide any necessary 
technical assistance, and develop prototype insurance products. These investments have 
“public goods” characteristics; however, once these types of investments have been made and 
a product is offered in the market, “free-riding” can occur — competitors can easily copy the 
product and thus capture the benefits of the investments made by others. Recognizing this, 
private-sector insurers are generally reluctant to bear the full cost of these initial investments. 
Thus, having donors and host countries support these initial investments to stimulate the 
Recent Developments in Insurance Markets to Transfer Weather Risk 
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development of weather index insurance markets is a form of a public good. We address these 
issues in the last section of the paper. In the remainder of this section we describe issues that 
must be addressed in a risk assessment. 
Risks must be highly correlated. Weather index insurance is only effective in transferring 
spatially correlated risks. Catastrophic risks (e.g., drought) are more likely to be spatially 
correlated than are mild to moderate risks (e.g., a moderate shortfall in rainfall). If the underlying 
weather variable is not highly spatially correlated, the basis risk will be too great for an index 
insurance product to provide effective risk protection. This can occur because of the nature of 
the risk (e.g., hail losses are generally less correlated than drought or flood) or because of 
geographical heterogeneity (e.g., areas that are characterized by many microclimates). 
Risk cannot occur too frequently. Part of the risk assessment involves carefully examining 
data and various contract designs to determine if the frequency and severity of losses can be 
properly assessed (see Box 1: Pricing Weather Index Insurance). If the risk being examined 
occurs too frequently (e.g., significant losses occur at least once every seven years), the 
transaction costs of insuring against the risk will be prohibitive. At the same time, insurance 
purchasers may grow impatient if they have not received an indemnity after purchasing the 
insurance for many years. Compounding this is the fact that individuals tend to underestimate 
their exposure to extremely low-probability, high-severity natural disasters.9 However insurers 
do not have this problem. To the contrary, they must take a more conservative position to 
assure that they are prepared to make insurance payments for the most extreme events. These 
characteristics of buyers and sellers can cause catastrophic insurance markets to fail if the price 
being charged by insurers is more than what the buyers are willing to pay. 
To evaluate the frequency and magnitude of loss for weather index insurance contracts, reliable 
historical weather data are required — ideally, at least 30 years of daily or dekadal (10-day) 
measurements. 
Specific opportunities create a suitable index. A concurrent component of a pre-feasibility 
analysis involves understanding what extreme weather events cause severe losses and when 
the vulnerability to losses is greatest. Index insurance requires a reliable and easily measurable 
index (e.g., rainfall) that proxies the severity of losses (e.g., shortfalls in crop yields). In addition 
to having adequate historical data on the index, it is critical that reliable measures of the index 
will continue to be available in the future. These measures should be conducted by a trusted 
third party (e.g., a national or international meteorological association). Using reliable third-party 
data helps ensure that neither the insurer nor the insured can influence the likelihood of 
payouts. Because the index is the basis for insurance payments, it is important that it be 
measured at locations close to the insured. For example if rainfall is the index, rain gauges 
should be located within a few kilometers of the insured. Thus, many weather index insurance 
products require well-maintained weather station infrastructure close to the insured. 
9 For further reading on cognitive failure see Recommending Readings topic section, Index Insurance for Lower Income Countries. 
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Box 1  Pricing Weather Index Insurance 
Price of Insurance = Pure Risk  
 + Reserve Load  
 + Ambiguity Load  
 + Administrative Costs  
  
Pure Risk. The pure risk is the insurer’s estimate of the amount of losses the insurer expects to pay. 
Insurers use historical weather data, i.e., the frequency and severity of weather events in the past, to 
develop a probability distribution. The figure is a probability distribution from 100 years of rainfall data for 
August in Andhra Pradesh, India. Consider the possibility of an insurance policy that makes a payout 
whenever rainfall is in excess of 2000 mm — shown as the shaded area. Based on the probability 
distribution and the structure of insurance payouts, the insurer could estimate the pure risk. For example, 
a pure risk of 7 percent would indicate that insurers expect to pay USD 7 for every USD 100 insured. 
Because this is the expected level of losses, it is the foundation for the insurance contract. The other 
costs of doing business are added to this base. 
Reserve Load. Reserve or catastrophe (CAT) loads are added to the price of insurance due to the risk of 
large payouts occurring early in the program — the most extreme event can occur before adequate 
reserves are built. To deal with this possibility, insurers use a mixture of ready access to capital that may 
include cash reserves and purchasing reinsurance to manage large financial losses. Reinsurance is a 
means for insurers to transfer the most extreme risks to international markets. Reinsurance protects the 
solvency of insurers and is almost always essential when selling index insurance.   
Ambiguity Load. Ambiguity loads account for the possibility that the available data do not represent the 
actual underlying risk. For example, if insurers only have a short time frame of data, they will increase 
ambiguity loads in case the data represent better-than-average years. In general, the more data, the less 
are the uncertainties and therefore ambiguity loads will be smaller. Changing weather patterns and 
concerns about climate change will undoubtedly create uncertainty and increase the cost of insuring the 
risk. Furthermore, ambiguity loads will be added when the quality of the historical data is poor.  
Administrative Costs. Delivery costs, marketing and education, research and development, staff and 
office overhead costs are some of the important administrative costs that must be included when pricing 
the insurance. Delivery and education, in particular, can be difficult and expensive if products are 
intended for households in remote locations. 
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One of the most significant advantages of weather index insurance is that lower transaction 
costs should be lower than for traditional agricultural insurance. This is particularly critical for 
smallholders for whom the transaction costs of traditional agricultural insurance are prohibitive. 
The major limitation of weather index insurance is basis risk. Thus, the tradeoff between lower 
transaction costs versus basis risk is one way to evaluate how well a weather index insurance 
product may work. Attempts to reduce basis risk by developing complex insurance contracts or 
creating and maintaining a densely populated set of weather stations may prove too costly. In 
some areas and for some products, one may need weather stations that are only a few 
kilometers apart. More spatially correlated catastrophic events may require less investment in 
infrastructure.  
Lessons Learned from Risk Assessment and Product Development  
The findings from a risk assessment are important regardless of whether an index insurance 
product is ever developed. Decision makers are often unaware of the probability and magnitude 
of potential catastrophic weather events. A risk assessment incorporates these factors into an 
estimate of the annualized expected cost of each extreme weather event. Seeing their risk 
exposure expressed in this way can be “eye opening” for many decision makers. For example, 
some early risk assessment work for weather index insurance began in Morocco in the late 
1990s.10 A drought insurance contract was designed; however, due to a declining trend in 
rainfall, the price of the risk was greater than anyone had anticipated. This effectively halted 
efforts to develop drought index insurance for this region of Morocco. 
Although efforts in Morocco did not lead to a drought insurance program, the findings of the risk 
assessment and the pricing of an insurance product led to a useful policy dialogue. The risk 
assessment suggested that the government was supporting cereal production in areas that had 
become climatically unsustainable.  
In the risk assessment and product development work we have performed, a number of 
important lessons have emerged:  
1. When catastrophic weather risks are present, the cost of these risks are being paid 
somewhere in the society. For example, the poor can be absorbing the cost both directly 
(by direct losses) or indirectly (by making conservative decisions that reduce their 
willingness to adopt new technologies and their ability to accumulate productive assets). 
But also, indirect losses can be absorbed by the public sector in post hoc strategies that 
have many hidden costs and create perverse incentives, or by donors and others that 
provide assistance after a national disaster.  
2. Assessing who is currently paying for catastrophic weather risk helps determine if there is 
a potential role for index insurance.  
3. Pricing weather risk provides useful information for a wide range of stakeholders who may 
use the information to reconsider current farming systems and institutional mechanisms 
that are used to cope with or compensate for losses after they occur.11  
10 See Recommended Readings country section, Morocco. 
11 For example, through mapping flood risk in Vietnam, we found that there were areas growing rice that were vulnerable to extreme 
flooding losses in about 1 in every 4 years. This discovery created a new discussion about whether these areas should be converted 
to other uses. 
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4. Relative risk exposure and thus the price of insurance can vary greatly across regions 
within the same country.  
5. The relative risk must be reflected in the pricing of insurance or it will result in inequities, 
potential adverse selection, and serious inefficiencies.  
6. When developing insurance products one must be aware of the potential for adverse 
selection — a common problem with existing index insurance products seems to be a 
failure to set the sales closing dates in advance of information that can help the insured 
know that the probability of a loss in higher than normal. Farmers and others use many 
systems to forecast weather for the coming season. 
7. Insurance products should be developed to complement existing risk coping and risk 
management strategies.  
 
Weather Data in Africa — A Serious Constraint  
The lack of available and reliable weather data is one of the major constraints when considering 
weather index insurance for Africa. As was described above, the availability of data is at the 
core of risk assessment and product development. The absence of quality weather data 
emerges as a chief constraint to the spread of weather index insurance in many regions of 
Africa. Given the importance of data and the potential cost of creating and maintaining new data 
systems, we review possible data that can be used for weather index insurance products in 
Africa. Data limitations shape many of our views about what products may be used responsibly 
and effectively in the near term and the sequence of development in our business model that 
may be most practical for market development in Africa. 
There are roughly 1,000 weather stations with quality-controlled, internationally available rainfall 
data — the type of stations most likely needed for obtaining reinsurance coverage — if stations 
were evenly distributed this would be one weather station for every 30,000 km2  (Funk et al., 
2003). In some locations in Africa (e.g., the Sahel and South Africa), the level of weather station 
infrastructure is actually declining (Ali et al., 2005; Sawunyama and Hughs, 2008). Without 
historical weather data, weather risks cannot be understood sufficiently to allow for the design 
and pricing of weather index insurance contracts. If the future availability of reliable weather 
data is not assured, no weather index insurance is possible. In many regions of Africa weather 
station infrastructure is simply too sparse and poorly maintained to successfully replicate the 
weather index insurance products sold to households in other countries (e.g., India). 
When weather station infrastructure is not in operation near the target user, the weather risk can 
be more crudely estimated using alternative methods. Data from weather stations can be 
interpolated to create a grid with estimated values between stations. These grids must take into 
account the topography (e.g., mountain ranges and bodies of water) that may affect weather 
patterns between the weather stations. Interpolating weather data tends to underestimate 
extreme events. 
Models adding satellite data to rain gauge interpolation and topography estimates such as the 
Collaborative Historical African Rainfall Model (CHARM, described in the Ethiopia case study) 
can contribute to weather risk gridding. Satellite data can be a valuable check, providing actual 
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data values between the rain gauges; however, a process for matching satellite data to true 
ground-level values has not been perfected. Satellite data used in these models currently lack 
the specificity needed to estimate extreme events accurately at a specific location. For example, 
the Climatology Prediction Center Merged Analysis of Precipitation (CMAP) is based on a 2.5° x 
2.5° longitude-latitude grid (over 100,000 km2 at its smallest point) for each value (Xie and Arkin, 
1997). Ali et al. (2005) compare several rainfall products (e.g., the Global Precipitation 
Climatology Center, the Global Precipitation Climatology Project, CMAP, and the Geostationary 
Operational Satellite precipitation index) that use rain gauge, satellite imagery, or a hybrid of the 
two to estimate rainfall in the Sahel. These products also underestimate extreme events, but Ali 
et al. (2005) find rain gauge data predict low rainfall values (values in the 25 percent quartile of 
the reference measure) more accurately than hybrid products, which, in turn, predict more 
accurately than pure satellite imagery products. 
A number of organizations (e.g., the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, World 
Meteorological Organization, Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), and 
International Livestock Research Institute) use some combination of rain gauge interpolation, 
satellite data, and models with other indicators to estimate regional weather for a variety of 
purposes. Choosing which rainfall data product to use often depends on the region of interest 
and the purpose for using the product (Ali et al., 2005). Because of the investments of these 
organizations and others, products using satellite data continue to improve, providing more 
precise and real-time estimates of weather in remote locations in Africa (e.g., Sung and Weng, 
2008). 
For our purposes, the alternative data sources described above can be very useful for 
conducting the risk assessment because they do provide estimates of the rainfall distribution 
over space and time. Thus, the sub-regional impact and frequency of events can be determined. 
Despite the benefits of these data sources for understanding weather risk, they are often 
inappropriate to use when developing farm-level weather index insurance for the reasons 
described above — a lack of specificity and the tendency to underestimate extreme events. 
These products are especially inappropriate for weather index insurance for moderate losses of 
a household in a specific location, such as the Malawi rainfall insurance. For some of the other 
products presented below, it may be possible to use systems other than ground-level weather 
stations to estimate and insure regional drought conditions. 
Alternative data sources exist that may offer more appropriate indexes on which to base 
insurance contracts. Satellite data represent a promising low-cost alternative to weather station 
data for index insurance. Satellite rainfall estimates originated in 1980 and have become 
increasingly more accurate over time (Dinku et al., 2007). Thus, there are nearly 30 years of 
data available in many regions. Unfortunately, even this accuracy is dependent on using 
ground-level weather stations as a means to calibrate the information. Thus, there may be 
limitations for using these data in a number of African nations for some time. 
In addition to lower costs, satellite data have other benefits relative to weather station data. 
First, unlike weather stations in some areas, satellite data are real-time data that can track 
emerging weather trends as they occur. Second, certain types of satellite data, and models that 
accompany that data, can be more inclusive than weather station data and have the potential to 
lower basis risk for some products. Unlike weather station data whose values are interpolated 
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between stations, satellite data are spatially continuous and can provide actual measurements 
for these points. 
The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) measures the amount of near-infrared light 
absorbed by plants and is a measure of vegetation density. NDVI data are available at 
resolutions of one square kilometer, which is much more site specific than CMAP or the other 
data sources described above (Ali et al., 2005; Peters et al., 2002). NDVI values are a measure 
of plant health. By comparing historical NDVI values to present values, the NDVI is being used 
to assess drought in some contexts (Bayarjargal et al., 2006; Peters et al., 2002). Satellite data 
also provide estimates of rainfall and temperature, which have been used in conjunction with 
NDVI data to create other drought estimation models; however, these different models yield 
differing results. Determining which NDVI-based models are most appropriate given the region 
and intended use of the model is still being worked out (Bayarjargal et al., 2006). 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is demonstrating significant potential. This technology 
penetrates cloud cover and, with the proper models, can provide localized estimates of soil 
moisture as well as a clear image for identifying water inundation from flooding. The World Bank 
is researching the use of SAR images for developing flood index insurance. Floods endanger 
households, disrupt business, and destroy agriculture, infrastructure, and other assets. If SAR 
images were found to be reliable measures of loss, this would be very significant for flood-prone 
regions in Africa with little or no access to insurance.  
In sum, using satellite imagery to underwrite index insurance is still considered experimental; 
however, these data are widely used in other venues and have been proposed for use in 
upcoming index insurance pilot projects. Further research and pilot testing are needed. 
Additionally, the receptivity of potential target users to insurance products based on satellite 
data remains untested. Still, NDVI, SAR, and other satellite data measured at high resolutions 
hold promise as potential indexes for areas where ground-level weather data sources do not 
exist or are insufficient. 
Case Studies and Alternative Approaches to Consider 
As we review the following case studies and present some alternative approaches, it becomes 
clear why we spent extra time reviewing weather data constraints in Africa. Data constraints 
limit the type of products and approaches that can be successfully implemented. While there are 
a number of developments in weather index insurance in Africa in recent years, projects in 
Ethiopia and Malawi have the longest history. These two projects also merit special attention as 
they represent two ends of a very wide spectrum of how weather index insurance products 
might be used in Africa. In Ethiopia, a product was purchased by an international organization 
(WFP) to supplement emergency aid; in Malawi, a product is purchased by smallholder farmers 
as part of a loan and an input package that can spur technological adoption. Data for the 
Ethiopia product are important, but not as critical as they are for implementing the Malawi 
project. The reasons are quite intuitive. Ethiopia involves estimating aggregate shortfalls in 
basic food production across the country. Thus, the refinements of the data are not as critical. 
Malawi involves estimating shortfalls of rain for individual farmers during critical time periods. 
Farmers who farm at significant distances from weather stations will not be served as well as 
those nearby the weather stations. 
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The Ethiopia project addresses emergency aid for a quick response to food security problems 
created by widespread drought. This important and potentially precedent-setting project opens 
the way for new approaches to getting emergency assistance into countries before a full-blown 
food crisis emerges. We review the Ethiopia project and then provide some additional ideas for 
how to extend this type of product. Importantly, we also caution that weather index insurance 
cannot guard against the current food crisis problems that are driven by dramatic increases in 
worldwide prices of basic commodities. Given the importance of this topic, Annex B briefly 
presents how and when price risk management instruments may be used. 
The Malawi project sets the standard for projects that are working to integrate weather index 
insurance to spur lending and technology adoption. Farmers are gaining access to loans 
because there is weather insurance. More fundamentally, the loans are being used to fund 
improved varieties of seeds. Nonetheless, the challenges associated with replicating the Malawi 
experience are daunting. Data and capacity constraints are significant and must be overcome. 
In many contexts, the cost of implementing such a project may become prohibitive. 
Beyond the case studies, we also introduce two alternatives that may offer opportunities for 
market development in many regions of Africa. Both of these ideas should require less 
infrastructure development for weather stations than the Malawi case. First, we introduce the 
idea of “Catastrophic Weather Events Livelihoods Insurance.” The idea of this weather index 
insurance is that it would not be targeted to a specific crop. Rather it would represent lower 
thresholds for payment and be designed to help farming households cope with a wide array of 
problems that are created by extreme weather events. As such it may require fewer weather 
stations as the target events would be more widespread catastrophes. The second alternative 
we introduce is weather index insurance for intermediaries, who serve smallholder farmers 
(agricultural lenders, input suppliers, and buyers). By removing some of the weather risks in the 
value chain, more economic activity should occur that should lead to technology adoption and 
economic development. 
African Case Study 1: Ethiopia12 
Ethiopia contains approximately 22 million farmers (CIA, 2008). The entire Ethiopian economy 
and food security for rural households can be threatened by low rainfall levels that damages 
agricultural production. The first prototype weather insurance for Ethiopia food security was 
designed by Skees et al. (2004). In 2006, the WFP purchased a weather index contract that was 
structured as a derivative to provide contingent financing in the case of extreme drought during 
the March–October agricultural season. The value insured was USD 7 million. The WFP 
purchased the contract from Axa Re (now Paris Re) for a premium of USD 930,000 (Alderman 
and Haque, 2007). Payments were triggered when the cumulative rainfall from March to 
October was significantly below the 30-year average, indicative of widespread crop failure and 
potential famine. In the case of a triggering event, the payment made to the WFP would be 
transferred to the Ethiopian government for distribution to vulnerable households according to 
the government’s existing cash-for-work poverty support program using community-based 
12 References for much of the information in this section that are not cited appear in the Recommended Readings country section, 
Ethiopia.  
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targeting methods. The contract was expected to benefit up to 63,000 households in 60 districts 
with maximum payments of about USD 100 (WFP, 2006).  
Daily rainfall data from 26 weather stations were collected by the Ethiopian meteorological 
agency and served as the basis for this contract. These data were submitted to an independent 
agency for validation. These represent the best weather stations in Ethiopia in terms of having 
complete and long historical datasets. They are over half of the 44 stations in Ethiopia for which 
historical data with few missing observations are available and roughly a fifth of the 120 official 
stations in Ethiopia. Few weather stations with good historical data exist in the pastoral regions; 
consequently, these regions were excluded from the pilot (Alderman and Haque, 2007). 
Ethiopia is dependent on agriculture, which employs eighty percent of its labor force and 
accounts for roughly 50 percent of GDP (CIA, 2008). The vast majority of crops in Ethiopia are 
rainfed and, as a result, household income is highly correlated with rainfall. Drought is the most 
common and most devastating disaster risk in Ethiopia. Significant droughts occurred in 2000, 
2002, and 2003. In data from 1900 to 2006, drought accounts for eight of the ten worst natural 
disasters on record (famine accounts for the other two), all 10 of which have occurred since the 
early 1980s. On average, almost 4 million people are affected and roughly 26,000 people perish 
when drought occurs in Ethiopia (UN/ISDR, 2008). 
While drought risk affects stakeholders at all levels, roughly seven percent of the Ethiopian 
population have food insecurity problems regardless of weather conditions. In drought years, 
the number of food-insecure households can easily double. Households have very limited 
access to credit. In Ethiopia, land is held publicly so it cannot be used as collateral. This has 
been a major impediment to lending. To address this, local governments sometimes provide 
loan guarantees for farmers. Thus, local governments are greatly exposed to the risk of natural 
disasters adversely affecting loan repayments for agriculture. Finally, at the macro level, safety 
net programs in Ethiopia are almost entirely funded by donor organizations. Because of the 
chronic food insecurity problems, food aid in Ethiopia is a constant. When drought occurs, donor 
programs (e.g., the WFP) require large and rapid increases in funding to provide relief to 
households entering the ranks of the food insecure. Drought relief efforts can often divert 
resources from other donor organization programs that are aimed at sustainable development. 
Thus, the risk assessment of drought in Ethiopia revealed that households, lenders, and donor 
organizations were all experiencing significant negative consequences associated with drought 
risk. 
Rainfall data for the risk assessment were provided by the FEWS NET in the form of daily 
CHARM data for 80 zones in Ethiopia for 43 years (1960–2003). CHARM uses interpolated 
weather station, satellite, and land elevation data to create a grid of rainfall in Africa. CHARM 
results in an improved estimate of rainfall over simple interpolated weather station data; 
however, compared to the interpolated weather station values, CHARM tends to underestimate 
extreme rainfall events — the most important events for insuring against drought at refined local 
levels. Additionally, specificity of CHARM is somewhat limited, especially in areas of complex 
topography, so it is best used for understanding rainfall patterns over large regions (Funk et al., 
2003). 
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Though basis risk may be too high for households to directly utilize index insurance based on 
CHARM data, these data can be effectively used for understanding drought risk in Ethiopia. 
Average rainfall declined over the 43 years of weather data, indicating drought risk is increasing. 
Ethiopia comprises five distinct regions based on rainfall patterns. In general, Ethiopia receives 
60 to 90 percent of rainfall in the rainy season, or kiremt (June–September). However, many 
areas also receive a springtime rain, called belg. Farmers in these regions can alter crop 
choices based on the timing and intensity of these rains. For example, they may choose to plant 
two seasons of short-cycle crops such as wheat and teff, or if the rains are late, farmers may 
choose to plant a single, long-cycle crop such as maize that is planted in belg but harvested in 
kiremt. 
In designing a weather insurance product, the initial work highlighted the importance of early 
payouts that can be structured with weather index insurance — even in the middle of the rainy 
season — given clear evidence that drought will be a problem. Because drought is a slow onset 
event, timely payments are critical because they can provide payments as the disaster emerges 
— before stakeholders are truly experiencing crisis. Thus, the early work suggested indemnities 
be determined on a monthly basis during the rainy season and that consideration be given to 
defining several points for payouts during the season. 
To emphasize the need for early payments, consider the case of drought in northern Kenya. In 
this region, drought is associated with famine measured as the prevalence of at least 20 percent 
of children severely wasted (Chantarat et al., 2007). Low mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) 
is a common estimate of child (aged 6 to 59 months) wasting and is predictive of infant mortality 
(Mei and Grummer-Strawn, 1997). Beyond infant mortality, childhood malnutrition, especially in 
the first 2 to 3 years of life, is associated with life-long stunted growth and cognitive and social-
emotional deficits that result in lower education completion, less learning per year of education, 
and lower economic potential (Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007). Children experiencing even a 
single famine during the first year of life continued to show lower cognitive and social-emotional 
deficits thirty years later (Galler and Barrett, 2001). Thus, protecting households from famine 
can be very important and provides a clear rationale for well-functioning food aid safety nets. 
However, the protection must come sooner than it does with current systems.  
Currently, food aid procurement requires months, challenging its ability to protect households 
from even slow onset events. For example, the average time from the formal request for U.S. 
food aid to delivery is 5 months (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). Because malnutrition can be so 
detrimental to lifelong developmental outcomes, mechanisms that expedite the food aid process 
can potentially have significant effects on household well-being and economic development. 
Chantarat et al. (2007) show that that rainfall estimates can be used to insure against famine in 
this region as a component of a safety net program. Rather than designing the contract to make 
payments based on indirect estimates of household well-being such as crop yields, they 
suggest designing rainfall insurance contracts that makes timely payments based on early 
indicators of drought and at levels that prevent famine (i.e., prevent severe child wasting from 
reduced consumption). 
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM ETHIOPIA 
The pilot conducted by the WFP represents a valuable experiment in safety net financing. 
Based on our illustrations above, early and timely payouts would likely be of interest to a 
number of governments and donors. In particular, these products could be used to insure 
against sub-regional disasters that fail to capture media attention, thus, they also fail to receive 
relief from the international community. For these products, payouts could be based on an 
aggregate of rainfall data (as was done in the WFP pilot) or satellite data. Thus, even in regions 
with very little weather station infrastructure, developing a food security index insurance product 
may be feasible. 
Additionally, insuring against sub-regional disasters may also be effective for localized price 
shocks. When local markets are not highly integrated, insuring against weather yields on the 
regional level may hedge against commodity price spikes that are created by localized 
shortages.13 Price increases will often occur when yields are low in the region due to correlated 
losses (e.g., a weather event or pest). In regions where drought is a major risk and markets are 
not well-integrated, a drought index insurance contract purchased by the government or a donor 
could fund the costs of bringing food relief into the region in a timely fashion. Alternatively, if this 
insurance product were injecting cash into a sub-region that has an inadequate food supply, 
food prices may increase enough for markets to overcome the high transport costs (previously 
contributing to poor integration of local markets) and to sell commodities in the food insecure 
region. In other words given the infusion of cash, the need resulting from food shortages could 
potentially be met through arbitrage within the country. This is a logical extension of what was 
begun in Ethiopia with the WFP. Such weather index insurance contracts at the sub-region level 
can also be developed using data systems other than weather stations as described earlier. 
Thus, these contracts are more feasible in the short term. It should be clear that such contracts 
are limited — they will not protect against global price spikes. They only provide localized 
protection when there is a crop failure in regions where the country infrastructure is not sufficient 
to have well-integrated price markets. Another critical issue that must be addressed and merits 
further consideration is how to distribute the cash infusion. 
African Case Study 2: Malawi  
As far as design and intent for an index insurance program, the Malawi pilot project is most 
consistent with the goal of spurring lending and the adoption of improved technology that could 
lead to a green revolution in Africa. The product is bundled with a loan and a specific input 
package that has improved seed. Without the associated drought index insurance, farmers 
would not be offered credit to purchase the improved seed varieties. The weather index 
insurance protects the loan to some extent as the lender is the one who receives any insurance 
indemnity. 
Drought is the most frequent weather disaster in Malawi. In terms of the number of individuals 
affected, all six of the most severe natural disasters in Malawi were droughts. On average over 
3.5 million individuals are affected when drought occurs in Malawi (UN/ISDR, 2008). Largely 
due to drought risk, crops tend to have low yields associated with low access to credit, poorly 
functioning input markets, and low uptake of technology (Hess and Syroka, 2005).  
13 See Annex B for more information for the use of price insurance instruments for food security. 
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Malawi has 22 government-managed weather stations that are of sufficient quality to develop a 
drought insurance product. The Malawi Meteorological Service has been a willing partner in 
providing historical and ongoing data to make payments in this World Bank project. Of the 22 
government-managed stations, 13 were used for the initial risk assessment. Stations having 
long histories (about 40 years) of data with very few missing values were selected. These 
stations were also dispersed throughout the country to assess the weather risk in disparate 
regions. Drought was defined as 75 percent of cumulative average rainfall over the rainy season 
(October–April). On average, drought occurs at two weather stations each year when measured 
in this way. This is roughly a 1-in-6-year event, which should be insurable. The historical data 
reveal localized, regional, and national drought occurring in Malawi (Hess and Syroka, 2005; 
Kimball, 2006). 
Groundnut farmers in Malawi wanting to plant with certified groundnut seed were unable to 
obtain credit because of the high default risk in the event of a drought (Alderman and Haque, 
2007). A drought in 2004–2005 led to high default rates ranging from 30 percent to 50 percent 
for agricultural loans. Many lenders refused to offer credit for agriculture after this event 
(Mapfumo, 2007). A pilot was launched in the 2005–2006 growing season linking the Insurance 
Association of Malawi; the smallholder farmers union, National Smallholder Farmers’ 
Association of Malawi (NASFAM); and two lenders (Alderman and Haque, 2007). The two 
lenders provided loans to smallholders who agreed to purchase index insurance. The loan 
covered the costs of seed and insurance premiums (Opportunity International, 2005). These 
products were presented as a bundled packet, which results in lower delivery costs than using 
an insurance sales agent. 
Farmers who purchase the index insurance agree to sell their yields to NASFAM. NASFAM acts 
as a delivery channel for the loan and insurance payouts and deducts the price of the loan from 
its payments to farmers for their yields. Insurance policies only cover the cost of seed for which 
farmers borrow from the bank, paying premiums at 6–7 percent of loan values. In the event of a 
payout, NASFAM deducts the amount from the farmer’s loan and passes the payout on to the 
bank. NASFAM deducts the leftover loan liability from farmers’ yield proceeds. In the event of a 
total payout, indemnities equal the value of the loan, and NASFAM does not deduct any amount 
from yield proceeds for loan payments (Opportunity International, 2005). 
Malawi yield data are limited and may be unreliable, and thus, alternative methods for 
structuring the rainfall insurance payout were pursued after the first year of the pilot (2005). The 
Malawi product used the FAO Water Requirement Satisfaction Index (WRSI) to establish the 
contract structure for drought insurance for groundnut. The WRSI is the ratio of water availability 
for a crop to water requirements for a crop during a season. The WRSI is weighted based on 
water needs during critical stages of development. Other, more robust crop growth models are 
available that mimic the physiological growth process of groundnut; however, given the limited 
data available, the WRSI was chosen for this project (Syroka, 2005). The WRSI requires several 
data inputs: 
1. Historical dekadal (10-day) rainfall data for a weather station; 
2. Average dekadal potential for the weather station; 
3. Water-holding capacity of the soil; 
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4. Water use patterns for the insured crop in the region (these are defined for the critical 
stages and interpolated between these stages); 
5. Maximum crop root depth; 
6. Seasonal-yield response factors for each crop, which allow the WRSI to be converted into 
yield estimates; and 
7. Start- and end-of-season time periods, and thus, the length of the growing period. 
Thus, the project designed the contract based on WRSI modeling of the effects of rainfall on 
groundnut crop yields. The benefit of using the WRSI is that the only input variable expected to 
vary is rainfall — all other model inputs are expected to remain constant. Thus, it can isolate the 
effects of rainfall on models of crop yields (Syroka, 2005). However, the drawback of the WRSI 
is that it assumes constant soil quality (e.g., constant water-holding capacity), which can differ 
dramatically within a region, especially in Africa. 
Contracts are divided into three phases, with emphasis on rainfall levels during the first two 
phases. The contracts were structured so that payouts would begin when rainfall levels were 
such that the expected decline in yields was 16 percent or 23 percent of optimal yield levels, 
depending on the region. Average yields in the pilot regions are between 88 and 96 percent of 
optimal yields. Thus, while the contracts are described as insuring against catastrophic risks, 
they are designed to protect against moderate declines in rainfall. The findings of this project 
concluded that rainfall at 65 percent of optimal levels was associated with total crop failure. 
Thus, payout limits were based on this amount and ranged from 58 to 68 percent, Syroka, 
2005). 
The product has been piloted in four areas, and to keep basis risk at an acceptable level, 
households must be within 20 km of a weather station to participate (Syroka, 2005). In the 
2005–2006 period, 892 farmers purchased weather insurance for a total sum insured of USD 
35,000. In the 2006–2007 growing season farmer uptake increased to 1,710 groundnut farmers 
and a rainfall-based insurance contract was also purchased by some 826 farmers for maize 
production. Client uptake of the rainfall index insurance product may have been inhibited by the 
good 2006 groundnut crop. No claims were paid and there was no demonstration effect. 
However, farmers report that yields when using hybrid seed rose by 140 percent (Mapfumo, 
2007). 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM MALAWI 
The Malawi pilot project has required a great deal of resources. However, this product is among 
the first to be carefully integrated into the value chain, and lessons learned should make future 
products of this nature easier to develop. The government of Malawi supports this activity, and 
the program has been incorporated into a larger World Bank project to support agricultural 
development. Other crops are being added as well. An expanded project will soon be 
considered by the World Bank board. Should the project be approved, it will support the 
installation of more weather stations (see Annex A). Additionally, the project will involve a local 
broker to work more closely with the lender, agribusinesses, insurance companies, and 
insurance regulator. 
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The Malawi case is an excellent example of working with farmer organizations, lenders, and the 
input supplier and should remain a case study for improving linkages in the value chain for 
stakeholders considering using index insurance in new contexts. The key stakeholders for this 
type of contract are represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1  Key Stakeholders for Malawi-type Weather Insurance 
 
 
Depending on the local setting, loans may be made by non-bank entities in the value chain, 
such as input suppliers or buyers of products. When this is the situation, the linkages in the 
value chain would be more direct. In every case, it must be clear that the insurance company is 
holding the weather risk and not the lender, an important regulatory concern that must be clearly 
stated in the contract language.  
A concern associated with weather index insurance products targeted to specific crops is these 
products can give farmers the mistaken impression that they are substitutes for traditional crop-
yield insurance policies. The educational and marketing efforts that must accompany these 
products are quite important. In their efforts to develop insurance products where the underlying 
index is highly correlated with yields for a specific crop, developers have considered a wide 
range of crop-yield models. Given that field-level, crop-yield data are nearly nonexistent in most 
African settings, developers generally use plant growth simulation models that link rainfall or soil 
moisture to the plant growth process, as was done in Malawi. This is a logical and necessary 
step. Still, several cautions are in order. First, these models assume that all farmers are using 
the same production methods and are farming the same type of soil. This assumption is 
questionable given the variety of farming techniques and soils in many regions of Africa. 
Second, these models may rely on limited or unsecured weather and crop data with missing 
values. These data are less likely to estimate extreme crop losses accurately. Finally, in some 
cases, these index insurance products are designed to insure moderate declines in crop yields, 
potentially creating more misunderstanding of their potential value if basis risk remains high. In 
short, these models can over-fit the weather index insurance product to the available data, 
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leading product designers to overestimate the effectiveness of their design as a proxy for 
household-level losses. 
Insurance regulation can improve transparency for this class of insurance products by setting 
standards for marketing and education and assuring that the insurance contract is clear. It is 
important that insurance regulators are made aware of strengths and weaknesses of weather 
index insurance products. One of the responsibilities of insurance regulators is to protect the 
consumer. While it is useful to have these products tied to a specific crop, it must be 
remembered that they are still weather insurance and not crop insurance. Contracts that clearly 
and simply outline the specific rules for payouts and the crop(s) that are covered can also 
increase transparency and reduce misunderstandings. In index insurance contracts, the insured 
should always be required to sign a statement that indicates that they fully understand that they 
can have a loss and not be paid. Misunderstandings from smallholder farmers about the 
products they purchase can create serious problems for long-term sustainability of these 
products. 
With its 22 government-supported weather stations, Malawi was chosen for a weather index 
insurance pilot because its weather station infrastructure is one of the strongest in the region 
(Hess and Syroka, 2005). This infrastructure, plus planned additional investments in rain 
gauges, may make scaling up weather index insurance to the national level feasible in Malawi. 
However, Malawi appears to have a better infrastructure of weather stations than many African 
nations. We would not recommend attempting to replicate a Malawi-type insurance product in 
countries with less-developed weather station infrastructure. Instead, products that rely on 
aggregated data will be more feasible in those regions; however, using aggregated data may 
limit development of weather index insurance products that attempt to insure against household-
level yield losses for specific crops. 
In sum, Malawi is an innovative and interesting case that seems to have facilitated valuable 
linkages within the value chain. It is an infant program in a single country and questions 
regarding its international scalability and sustainability remain, yet valuable lessons can be 
learned from its development and implementation. 
Catastrophic Weather Event Livelihoods Insurance  
Weather index insurance could potentially insure any business affected by a particular 
catastrophic weather event. Rural households in Africa are likely to be involved in a number of 
livelihoods strategies. Some of these strategies will involve producing crops and livestock for 
market or for home consumption. Many of the rural poor are landless even though their 
livelihood strategies and labor activities may strongly depend on good weather. Furthermore, 
many small farmers in Africa are net food purchasers. Thus, when there is a localized drought 
they are paying a much higher percentage of their income for food. This is from normal levels 
that exceed 50 percent. As was discussed earlier, the very livelihood strategies meant to 
diversify income can fall apart if an extreme weather event creates simultaneous problems for 
several of the strategies. In Africa, households sometimes even plant different crops in the 
same field — a practice known as intercropping. Tying weather index insurance to a single 
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livelihood — agriculture — and a single crop may be inconsistent with the type of protection that 
many households need. 
Weather index insurance that protects households against catastrophic losses that affect a 
number of livelihood strategies may be most beneficial. In a sense, we are recommending a 
new class of “business interruption” insurance for smallholder households against catastrophic 
weather risks. We prefer to call it “catastrophic weather event livelihoods insurance.” 
This new form of insurance would be less restrictive on a couple of important fronts. First, 
regulators should be more comfortable with an index insurance product framed as “business 
interruption.” In traditional business interruption insurance, one can never know exactly the 
magnitude of foregone profits due to the business interruption event; the loss adjustment is 
based on a number of logical assumptions. This is consistent with many other forms of business 
interruption insurance. For example, if a firm purchases a business interruption insurance 
against fire, the loss adjustment process may examine previous years of profits to forecast what 
the profits would have been in the absence of the fire. In general, regulators are typically more 
tolerant of what is accepted as a loss assessment for business interruption insurance. This 
eases some of the burden to prove that the index insurance will be a close proxy for loss. With 
respect to index insurance, the loss assessment is based on a pre-agreed relationship between 
the index and the losses.  
Second, a typical insurance requirement is that the insured be able to demonstrate an insurable 
interest. Thus far, weather index insurance targeted at crops also requires that the insured 
control some plantings of the crop that is being insured with the weather index insurance. This 
excludes the landless poor even though they may actually be more vulnerable to the extreme 
weather event than someone who has control over plantings. With catastrophic weather event 
livelihoods insurance, any household in the region whose livelihood could be affected by a 
specified extreme weather event (e.g., drought or flood) would be considered to have an 
insurable interest and thus could purchase this insurance. Regulators may want to place an 
upper limit on the sum insured to protect against gambling behavior. 
The primary benefit of livelihoods insurance over more specialized commodity-specific weather 
index insurance is that it may more closely proxy the impact of catastrophic weather events on a 
household’s entire portfolio of livelihood strategies. If weather index insurance only covers 
losses associated with production of a specific commodity, households may find that much of 
their portfolio of livelihood strategies remains exposed to the targeted extreme weather event. 
Weather index insurance that is not tied to a specific livelihood strategy would be easier to 
design. There would be no need to use sophisticated plant growth simulation models to try to 
design the underlying index or insurance parameters to optimize the correlation with production 
shortfalls for a particular commodity. The insurance could also be marketed differently. 
Currently, weather index insurance is typically marketed as a substitute for traditional crop 
insurance. But if a single catastrophic weather event can simultaneously affect multiple 
livelihood strategies, the outcome can literally be life-threatening for many poor households. 
Thus, catastrophic weather events livelihoods insurance might be marketed in ways that are 
more similar to life insurance. 
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This form of insurance could also be marketed and bundled with technology and lending just as 
is currently being done with crop-specific index insurance in Malawi. However, we believe that 
this general livelihoods insurance is also appropriate for situations where data are more limited, 
1) because it does not require data for crop models or yield estimates, and 2) because it insures 
against catastrophic events (e.g., drought). These catastrophic events are by nature more highly 
spatially correlated than more shallow loss events. For drought, the payout threshold would be 
set well below the expected value. Thus, a basket of weather station measures or even some 
form of satellite data could potentially serve as the index for this product. 
We believe that throughout much of Africa there are insufficient weather and crop yield data to 
support highly complex forms of weather index insurance contracts. We also believe that more 
straightforward contracts have an advantage in that they are easier for stakeholders to 
understand. Of course, basis risk will always be a problem with index insurance contracts and 
this issue must be presented in a clear fashion. 
The “all crops” weather index insurance contract currently used in India, presented in Figure 2, 
could serve as a basis for developing catastrophic weather event livelihoods insurance. Such a 
contract is clearly generic and organized for the critical time periods for the growing season. 
There are at least two limitations associated with the proposed catastrophic weather event 
livelihoods insurance product. First, in comparison to the product currently being offered in 
Malawi, livelihoods insurance is less directly tied to a specific technology adoption strategy. Still, 
livelihoods insurance could be bundled and sold with technology. Additionally, the livelihoods 
approach may represent an optimal use of limited funds for insurance premiums and, to the 
extent that household decision makers recognize that these products reduce risks they should 
be more willing to invest in higher-risk, higher-return activities. Thus, this type of product could 
still encourage more risk taking on the part of the working poor, including the adoption of 
technology. A particular challenge for product developers will be designing products that make 
payouts frequently enough to maintain household interest in the product, but not so frequently 
as to make the products unaffordable. Designing products for weather risks that occur at a 1-in-
7- to 1-in-10-year frequency seems to balance these two needs. A second potential limitation is 
that insurance for catastrophic risks may be more difficult to sell if individuals indeed tend to 
underestimate their exposure to very low-frequency catastrophic loss events. Yet, increasing 
evidence indicates that poor households are willing to purchase life insurance — protection 
against a rare but catastrophic event — so they may be willing to purchase a livelihoods 
weather insurance product if it were marketed in a similar way. 
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Figure 2  Sample Termsheet for Weather Index Insurance in India 
TERMSHEET FOR WEATHER INDEX INSURANCE
Product Reference NA06
Crops Any crop in the district
Reference Weather Station Nalgonda
Index
Definition of Day 1
If above condition is not met in June, Policy invariably starts on July 1
Policy Duration 110 days
Cover Phase I II III
Duration 35 days 35 days 40 days
Strike (mm) < 60 80 -
Exit (mm) < 10 10 -
Notional (Rs / mm) 10.00                   10.00                   -
Policy Limit (Rs) 1,000                   1,000                   -
Phase premium (Rs) 90                       90                      
Strike (mm) > - - 240                    
Exit (mm) > - - 340                    
Notional (Rs / mm) - - 10.00                   
Policy Limit (Rs) - - 1,000                   
Phase premium (Rs) - - 110                    
Combined Premium (Rs) 280                     
Combined policy limit (Rs) 3,000                   
Data Source Indian Meteorological Department
Settlement Date Thirty days after the data release by IMD and verified by Insurer.
Aggregate rainfall during the cover phases in mm.
If rainfall on a day is < 2 mm it is not counted in the aggregate rainfall
If rainfall on a day is > 60 mm it is not counted in the aggregate rainfall
Above condition applicable only for deficit rainfall cover and not for excess 
rainfall cover
y
month of June at reference station is observed >= 50 mm
PUT
CALL
 
Source: BASIX of India; a similar contract appears in Manuamorn, 2007 
 
Weather Insurance for Intermediaries  
Intermediaries exposed to the financial problems created by correlated risk, such as droughts or 
floods, should also benefit from access to catastrophic weather event livelihoods insurance. 
Input suppliers can have business interruption problems if, as a result of an emerging drought, 
local farmers do not purchase seeds and other production inputs. Similarly, if crop losses cause 
financial stress among farmers in the area, they may have to reduce their purchases of inputs 
for the subsequent production season. 
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Processors or other aggregators of the output from agricultural activity will also face business 
interruption costs as the profits from this sector are directly tied to the output in the region. 
Through-put of commodities is critical to maintain the infrastructure investments that are made 
to store, ship, or process commodities. Undoubtedly, correlated weather risks account for at 
least some of the lack of investment by processors and transporters of agricultural output 
throughout some parts of Africa. 
Correlated weather risk also leads to credit rationing in some rural areas. If agricultural banks 
could transfer some of their exposure to correlated risk with weather index insurance products, 
they may be able to improve their financial performance and increase lending in the region. An 
index insurance product could help lenders offset the real costs associated with loan defaults 
and debt restructuring in the wake of a catastrophic loss event (Skees and Barnett, 2006). 
Furthermore, weather index insurance could offset some of the costs associated with regulatory 
requirements for increased provisioning when repayment is in arrears. Weather index insurance 
could also reduce liquidity problems since depositors tend to draw down savings following 
catastrophic events. Thus, business interruption insurance could provide timely access to 
capital for lenders.  
Passing Benefits to Households 
Allowing lenders to pass through the benefits of the large indemnity payment from weather 
index insurance may be the most efficient way to deal with the large transaction costs 
associated with providing more complete financial services to poor rural households. This does 
not mean that the lender would be underwriting the weather risks, but rather the lender would 
link the benefits of the aggregate index payments to the loans held by households. More 
sophisticated arrangements that make payments based on risk zones for group lending and 
group indemnity could also evolve to address special regulatory standards for microinsurance 
products. In turn, those in higher risk zones would be required to pay higher interest rates for 
this form of composite product. 
The value of weather index insurance is actually enhanced when it is blended with banking and 
credit services. The role of index insurance is to manage the correlated risk of widespread 
losses by shifting those losses to those willing and better able to assume the risk — generally 
financial and reinsurance markets. In turn, the local banking sector should be able to work with 
individual producers to help them manage idiosyncratic and basis risk. If a producer has an 
independent loss when the index insurance does not pay an indemnity, it should be possible to 
borrow from the bank to smooth that shock. By combining insurance with banking in this 
manner, it is possible to address one of the main concerns associated with index insurance — 
basis risk.  
Data and Assessing Losses 
Given the data constraints and the discussion about alternative data systems for many regions 
in Africa, it will likely be easier to develop more aggregated weather index insurance contracts 
for intermediaries than localized contracts for households. More to the point, the level of 
refinement needed to capture a regional weather catastrophe is much less than what is needed 
to capture weather events affecting individual households.  
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Drought risk is the event that merits the most serious attention for weather index insurance 
targeted to intermediaries. As was described in the data section, a number of approaches are 
emerging to capture regional drought risk. Understanding the relationship between true 
business costs and drought risk requires working directly with experts in the business, and in 
many cases, getting management to consider scenarios that may have occurred ten or fifteen 
years prior, a time when many of the entities were not in business. The business must consider 
their current base today and project the impact on cash flow should a historic catastrophic event 
reoccur in the current year. This scenario analysis can be mapped to the severity and frequency 
of past events in a fashion that gives everyone a base for considering how much weather index 
insurance should be purchased and how such insurance may assist in offsetting economic 
losses.  
Business Interruption and Flood Risk 
As flooding is also a major disaster event in Africa, there may be opportunities to use index 
insurance for flooding events. However, floods are among the most difficult events to insure and 
there are little historical data on flooding in lower income countries. Flooding events can be 
created or made worse by how dikes, dams, and water catchments are managed. Management 
is not an insurable risk. Thus, it will not be easy to develop flood index insurance for 
intermediaries in Africa. GlobalAgRisk has worked on the development of flood index insurance 
in Peru and Vietnam (Skees, Hartell, and Murphy, 2007). A brief summary of that work follows 
to give some perspective on how such insurance might be organized for Africa. 
ENSO Insurance in Peru 
In the northern region of Peru, extreme flooding can be directly linked to El Niño events. As the 
Pacific Ocean temperature increases beyond certain thresholds, warm air moves into the 
region. In the foothills of the mountains this warm air mass meets the cold air cascading down 
the Andes. This phenomenon creates massive rainfall that lasts for several weeks. The two 
most recent severe El Niño events (1983 and 1998) devastated a number of regions in Peru 
with massive flooding. The flooding washed away crops, destroyed basic infrastructure, and 
disrupted all forms of small trade. Default rates for all MFIs operating in the northern coastal 
department of Piura prior to the 1998 El Niño were around 8 percent. After El Niño, default rates 
increased to about 18 percent. While not all of this increase can be attributed to El Niño, much 
of it was driven by the major disruptions created by El Niño flooding. We proposed a simple 
insurance contract that would pay when the ENSO (El Niño Southern Oscillation) 1.2 exceeds a 
value of 2.0. This means that the water temperatures in the zone off the coast of Peru are 
roughly 2 degrees Celsius above normal — a clear signal that flooding would be severe. The 
insurance regulator of Peru approved this class of ENSO insurance products for lenders and 
other stakeholders at risk when such extreme events create problems for their portfolio. At this 
point, an insurance company in Peru and a global reinsurer are pursuing the market and several 
lenders have expressed an interest in purchasing the contract to offset economic losses that are 
created during these periods.  
River Flood-Level Index Insurance in Vietnam 
In Vietnam, early flooding in the Mekong Delta creates serious problems for smallholder rice 
farmers who cannot harvest in time to avoid the damage that will occur. For those who harvest 
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early, the quality of rice is poor and prices are much lower. In this case, we organized an index 
based on river levels as the water crossed the border between Vietnam and Cambodia. By 
working closely with the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and 
with Vietnamese experts on flooding who produced flood zones that matched the river levels, 
we demonstrated the relationship between loan portfolio performance in one province and water 
levels. A Vietnamese insurer and a global reinsurer offered a business interruption flood 
insurance product to VBARD in May, 2008. Unfortunately, the contract was offered too late. 
VBARD was monitoring the levels of water in the Mekong River and knew that the likelihood of a 
flood event was very low. The contract was designed to pay for flooding in late June and early 
August. VBARD has expressed an interest in this contract for next year. 
Recommendations for Market Development for Weather Index Insurance  
For some time, we have been developing weather index insurance based on some fundamental 
principles about where insurance fits best for different levels of risks. For frequent and low-
consequence risk, those exposed should absorb the risk via traditional risk coping mechanisms. 
For less frequent, but moderate-consequence risks, individuals may use savings, lending, and 
some insurance solutions. When truly catastrophic risk occurs (low-frequency, but high-
consequence events), some form of catastrophic insurance is needed. In some cases, this may 
involve a level of government or donor support. In many situations this blend of risk retention, 
savings, lending, and then insurance can be more optimal than putting insurance into place to 
deal with events that happen too frequently. This is part of what motivates our “rule of thumb” — 
not to create weather index insurance for events that occur more frequently than 1 in 6 or 1 in 7 
years and motivates our business model — to “get the big risk out of the way first.” 
As we have seen, existing data systems may not be sufficient to support well-defined farm-level 
index insurance products in many regions of Africa. To the extent that data can support what we 
present as catastrophic weather event livelihoods insurance, this may be a better starting point 
for household insurance products. Households with catastrophic risk coverage can benefit from 
the improved business opportunities described above: new linkages to lending or improved 
inputs, and the timely indemnity payments that offset income losses. 
Even catastrophic weather event livelihoods insurance may be difficult to develop and in some 
cases, addressing the big risk first has led us to recommend introducing the insurance product 
for other stakeholders (e.g., lenders) that are affected by the correlated risk. These efforts 
develop a foundation for the market by building local capacity with weather index insurance. In 
turn, this market can lead to new products. In some cases, pass-through arrangements may be 
possible. For example, a bank could potentially disperse a large insurance payment among its 
clients. In addition, bundling loans or savings accounts with weather index insurance for 
households is possible, as this has been done with other microinsurance products. Also, more 
investments in delivery could be made in this process, such as using technology to deliver 
products to households. 
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The Role of Governments and Donors14 
In this section, we outline what public goods investments might be most beneficial for 
governments to make for spurring the use of weather index insurance products in economic 
development contexts in Africa. We recognize that governments are investing in a myriad of 
public goods that contribute to development, and in many cases, donors are assisting 
governments with important contributions. That being said, we hope if donors decide to 
implement any of our suggestions they do so only with the knowledge and support of the 
government. Thus, our discussion focuses on public goods with the assumption that donors will 
often be involved in these investments. 
For long-term sustainability of insurance markets, governments are best suited for the role of 
facilitator, not the direct deliverer of insurance products. This role includes establishing an 
appropriate enabling environment and providing certain public goods. More specifically, a 
government or donor can support such things as: 
• Improvements in data systems and data collection; 
• Improvements in the legal and regulatory environment; 
• Educational efforts about the use of weather insurance; 
• Product development; and 
• Financing for catastrophic losses. 
In some cases, governments or donor agencies may choose to provide financing for 
catastrophic losses as discussed below. In general, however, governments should not be in the 
business of providing insurance. In any case, governments should rarely provide direct premium 
subsidies, which often undermine the incentives of private-sector insurance companies. Also, 
such subsidies generally favor wealthier farm households and thus erode poverty objectives. 
Even targeted premium subsidies rarely work as planned. 
Supporting Improvements in Data Systems and Data Collection  
Improving data infrastructure is likely the highest priority public good for stakeholders hoping to 
spur the use of weather index insurance in Africa. First, governments can have a direct and 
immediate effect by providing greater access to existing data because many governments are 
missing quality systems for archiving and sharing historic weather data. Second, African 
governments wanting to pursue household-level weather index insurance products will likely 
need to make immediate investments in weather station infrastructure. However, investing in 
new weather stations will be ineffective unless explicit plans for ongoing maintenance are 
included. 
Because data are critical to the development of weather insurance markets, the equipment 
involved in developing weather data must be reliable, accurate, and secure from any potential 
tampering, and professionals who work with the equipment must be trustworthy. Other types of 
information are also important in the development of weather insurance. Examples include yield 
14 This section is based on Skees et al., 2006, a document that GlobalAgRisk prepared for USAID. 
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data and other information on losses caused by extreme weather events, changes in land use 
and input use intensity, and records of past disaster management activities or infrastructure 
changes. Government can play an important role in facilitating index insurance by collecting, 
maintaining, and archiving the data needed. These data should be made available for public use 
and for use by those with commercial interests wishing to develop innovative weather insurance 
products. 
Supporting Improvements in the Legal and Regulatory Environment  
As with any market, a legal and regulatory environment must exist for creating enforceable 
contracts that both buyer and seller can trust. Additionally, making laws and regulations 
consistent with international standards improves the chances of gaining access to global 
markets for risk transfer, which is crucial for making weather index insurance sustainable. 
Unfortunately, in many African countries, laws and regulations are simply not in place to 
accommodate the development and use of weather insurance products. Human capacity 
building and technical assistance are essential for preparing the legal and regulatory 
environment to govern index insurance programs. 
If an effective legal system is not in place, insurance contracts may lose validity, or there may 
be a reluctance by insurers and reinsurers to enter the market. For example, it is not uncommon 
for insurance companies to refuse to pay valid claims simply because there is no effective 
oversight, which undermines public confidence and demand for insurance. On the other hand, 
insurers may be reluctant to sell policies if there is a possibility that the government could alter 
the terms of the insurance contract after the insurance is sold. If judges and lawyers do not have 
a good understanding of insurance law, insurers may be forced to make indemnity payments in 
excess of their obligations under the policy.  
In sum, basic contract enforcement and regulations that attempt to assure insurer solvency may 
be lacking in many locations in Africa. Effective regulation and contract enforcement will be very 
important to the long-term reputation and performance of weather index insurance programs; 
therefore, investments to improve the legal and regulatory environment through technical 
assistance and capacity building are vital for many African countries. These governments 
should refer to international experience and best practice guidance to establish an appropriate 
enabling environment, provide public goods that support market development, and undertake 
any other interventions. 
Supporting Educational Efforts about the Use of Weather Insurance  
Potential users must be educated about the advantages and disadvantages of index insurance 
products. To increase the likelihood that information is presented in a balanced way and that 
sufficient investments are made in a broader educational effort for an untested product, public 
funds from governments and/or donors may be required. If insurance is not commonly available 
in the countryside, general education about insurance and risk management may be necessary. 
Index insurance policies are typically much simpler and easier to understand than traditional 
farm-level insurance policies. However, potential users may need help in evaluating how well 
the index insurance works for their individual risks. In particular, products designed for 
households will require significant educational investments because they will be sold in larger 
quantities than products for intermediaries, governments, or donors. 
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Educating members in the value chain may also be an important role for governments and 
donors, especially if donors have a previous working relationship with a bank, input supplier, 
etc. Donors may have an advantage for helping these intermediaries consider the benefits of 
catastrophic weather event livelihoods insurance or a Malawi-type insurance product and how 
providing incentives for households to purchase these products could improve the business of 
the intermediary. Thus, education efforts and formalizing linkages in the value chain can be very 
important for protecting households from weather shocks and for immediately increasing 
business opportunities. 
Supporting Product Development 
One of the challenges associated with private-sector development of new financial products is 
the ease with which they can be copied and replicated by others. This “free-rider” problem 
discourages many companies from making initial investments in new product development, 
especially in underdeveloped markets. Thus, some level of government and/or donor support for 
product development can be justified. These investments should be targeted at feasibility 
studies and developing pilot tests of new products with the involvement of local private-sector 
partners. Every attempt should be made to ensure that the knowledge and technology for new 
product development is passed on to local experts as soon as possible.  
Supporting Financing for Catastrophic Losses  
Until a sufficient volume of business has been established to attract global reinsurers, extreme 
losses for the insurance pool may need to be underwritten by government and/or donors, 
perhaps through contingent loans. For example, the World Bank has a contingent loan for the 
Mongolian Index-based Livestock Insurance Pilot. If losses for the insurance companies and the 
domestic reinsurance fund are fully exhausted, the World Bank loan can be accessed to make 
indemnity payments. 
Another possible role for government or donors is to provide financing for low-probability, high-
consequence events. As indicated earlier, those at risk tend to ignore the probability of the most 
extreme and infrequent loss events, but insurers do not ignore these events and consider the 
probability of such catastrophic losses when calculating premiums. This creates a gap between 
what buyers are willing to pay and what sellers are willing to accept for protection against very 
infrequent but catastrophic losses. Governments can provide the financing for this extreme layer 
of risk in a number of ways that still maintains incentives for domestic insurers to operate in a 
proper fashion. Still, governments engaging in these types of public-private partnerships should 
do so with caution, in particular, considering who is capturing the benefits from the proposed 
agreements. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
The Potential of Weather Index Insurance for Spurring a Green Revolution in Africa 
Jerry R. Skees and Benjamin Collier, GlobalAgRisk, Inc. 
31
Conclusions  
Weather index insurance shows signs of promise as knowledge of the concepts and experience 
with pilot programs are rapidly expanding. The growth and maturity of pilot programs may prove 
to have a significant influence on spurring a green revolution in Africa. We have carefully built 
the case for why weather risk transfer is important in Africa. We have also developed some 
details to demonstrate why the development of such markets will take time and resources. 
Clearly, the economic literature on poverty traps, risk aversion, and the growth dynamics of the 
poor suggest that improving financial services can improve risk taking, technological adoption, 
and asset accumulation for poor households. Consistent with these theoretical foundations, 
empirical evidence is showing that lower income countries where both the banking and the 
insurance sector are growing have a faster growth rate than lower income countries that have 
no growth in insurance markets. Still, as should be very clear from this paper, developing 
insurance markets to transfer catastrophic weather risk is not an easy undertaking. 
The precedent for using weather insurance for humanitarian aid was established by the WFP in 
2006 with the first-ever drought contract for food security contract in Ethiopia. Getting timely 
payments into regions during an emerging food crisis could mitigate problems prior to a full 
blown crisis. This is significantly different from current approaches that move food aid well after 
the crisis has started. In many regions in Africa, commodity markets are not well-integrated. 
This creates the need for sub-region weather index insurance products to get cash into the 
areas affected. The cash could also be used to arbitrage markets and market imperfections at 
some level. Thus, this type of response could facilitate commodity market development as well. 
Experience thus far in Malawi is demonstrating how to package weather insurance, loans, and 
new technology. Farmers who have adopted the use of new seed varieties report significant 
increases in yield. Many aspects of the Malawi experience will provide valuable lessons so the 
activity there merits careful watching. However, given data constraints and the high cost of 
capacity building, Malawi will be difficult to replicate. With these constraints in mind, we 
introduce a modified system for delivering more generic weather index insurance as a means of 
protecting a broad range of livelihoods activities that may be negatively affected by extreme 
weather events. This type of livelihoods insurance product may fit African conditions better than 
attempting to tailor weather index insurance to a specific crop. Furthermore, it may not require 
the same infrastructure investments in weather stations if the event affects a large geographic 
area. We also expand on the idea of businesses in the value chain using weather index 
insurance as a means for them to cope with the weather-driven problems of their customers. In 
particular, we believe that these products can be used by agricultural lenders who have loan 
performance problems following a large weather event that create cash flow problems for their 
borrowers. 
The task of getting all of the ideas, potential use, concerns, and cautions regarding weather 
index insurance into a single paper is daunting. Undoubtedly, we have omitted items and 
ongoing activity that are important to this discussion. For this reason, we encourage you to 
review the Recommended Reading list. 
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Annex A  Price and Weather Risk Management in East and Southern Africa World Bank’s 
Agriculture & Rural Development Department Commodity Risk Management Group 
Background 
Over the past few years, operational work of the World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management 
Group has demonstrated that successful application of market-based approaches to commodity 
risk management depends heavily on a) the commercial involvement of actors within the 
existing supply chain (such as producer groups, processors, exporters, banks, and insurance 
companies) and b) anchoring capacity building on commodity risk management in larger 
programs and operations. Below is a list of ongoing projects in the region focused on providing 
organizations within the supply chain with the technical skills and capacity to implement risk 
management programs. 
Malawi. In 2005, the Insurance Association of Malawi (IAM) offered an index-based weather 
insurance policy, linked with credit supply, to small-scale farmers. This first policy was piloted at 
four different weather stations during the 2005/2006 growing season and offered again in 
2006/2007. In July 2007, OIBM and Alliance One (a major contract farming operation in Malawi) 
expressed an interest in piloting a weather insurance product for tobacco at the portfolio-level, 
to insure part of their tobacco loan portfolio against deficit and excess rainfall. This differed from 
the initial pilot years since the bank, the farmers, and Alliance One shared the cost of the 
insurance and the policy is acting as protection for the institutions, rather than the farmers. In 
2008, the program is being scaled up to include more tobacco and maize farmers, as well as, 
expand to other crops including paprika, soya, and tea. Technical support is being provided to 
stakeholders in Malawi on all aspects of program implementation including contract design, 
business processes for roll-out and product marketing, and insurance/reinsurance 
arrangements. 
The Government of Malawi is also in the process of using risk management tools to strengthen 
its food security strategy. This work began in 2005 when the Government used a SAFEX-based 
call option to hedge the price risk of maize imports during the food crisis. In May of 2006 and 
May of 2007, Malawi faced a projected maize surplus and the Government was struggling with 
decisions about whether or not to allow exports, and how much to export. In order to 
demonstrate how market-based approaches could help manage uncertainty associated with this 
decision, the Bank worked with the government and the private sector to structure contingent 
export contracts. The contingent export contracts were based on put options, which would have 
provided an opportunity to sell at a pre-agreed price if it was determined later in the season that 
the country had sufficient maize. Although the contracts were not taken up, they were useful as 
a demonstration of how contingent contracting could be used to help manage risk associated 
with surpluses. Currently, Malawi is facing another project maize surplus, but also a much 
tighter regional/global market. Within the country, there continues to be a fairly high level of 
uncertainty about crop estimates. The price/supply risk management tool being considered this 
year is a repurchase option, which is based on a call option combined with a trade finance 
structure for grain held in the country. This agreement will help Government arrange, through 
the private sector, for maize to be held in 3-4 locations throughout the country, until 
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November/December of next year. Government will have the right to repurchase the maize if it 
appears that the country might have a shortfall during next year’s lean season. If maize is 
needed in the country, Government will exercise the call option and repurchase stocks which 
can then be re-sold through the private sector. If maize is not needed in the country, the private 
sector partners in this arrangement will have the right to export. Export permits, with a validity 
date one day after the option’s exercise date, will be required at the time of signing the 
repurchase agreement. The objective of this approach is to set up a 2nd layer of grain reserves 
which operates financially, through the private sector. It also helps the Government address the 
difficult question of whether or not to allow exports, and how to signal to the private sector its 
intentions about exports. The repurchase option is expected to be agreed and finalized before 
the middle of June, 2008. 
Along with this, Government is also planning to use, for the first time, an index-based weather 
derivative contract designed to transfer to the market the financial risk of severe and 
catastrophic national drought that adversely impacts the Government’s budget. With the 
approval of weather derivatives, the World Bank can for the first time offer financial 
intermediation services to low-income client countries of the International Development 
Association (IDA), and will add to the range of risk-management tools available to middle-
income client countries of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
In the case of Malawi, the World Bank will act as intermediary between the country and 
reinsurance companies or investment banks that offer weather risk management products. An 
independent third-party will monitor the weather data which will be then entered into a crop-
rainfall model that determines whether Malawi receives a payout. The weather derivative for 
Malawi requires an upfront premium and is designed to manage the risk of low probability but 
high severity events, like severe droughts, rather than the risk of events that occur more 
frequently, like minor or normal droughts. 
Kenya. In March 2008, FSD Kenya, The Rockefeller Foundation, International Livestock 
Research Institute and The World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management Group (“the partners”) 
convened a workshop for approximately fifty institutions with an interest index-based weather 
and livestock insurance. On the basis of the outstanding interest from participating institutions, 
the partners decided to fund a joint program to support the development of multiple product 
pilots. Interest from participants at this workshop reinforced the likely suitability of weather 
insurance in  Kenya where the agro-meteorological climate is moderate; the availability and 
quality of weather data — including historical data, which is essential to the construction of an 
index — is high; there exists a large and dynamic set of insurers and delivery channels, such as 
banks and microfinance institutions, available to distribute the product; and the market is 
sufficiently large to attract the interest of reinsurers. A program manager is currently being hired 
to lead the program activities which should result in a pilot program in March of 2009. 
Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, the Commodity Risk Management Group is working as part of the 
Financial Sector Capacity Building Project, a 2 year project, funded by the World Bank and the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The Financial Sector Capacity Building Project has 
four components one which is the promotion of greater financial diversity by supporting and 
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developing new financial instruments, and, specifically, weather insurance. The Bank has been 
supporting the NBE in developing TORs for consultants who will carry out the primary project 
activities which include, (a) piloting weather insurance in four different woredas by providing 
technical assistance to insurance companies and end-user beneficiaries; (b) determining the 
scalability of the insurance product to explore potential linkages to input financing; (c) 
determining the institutional capacity and infrastructure investments required by the National 
Meteorological Services Authority to provide efficient and sufficient robust weather information 
for expansion of the product; and (d) providing capacity building including technical assistance 
to the banking and insurance sectors. This work is building on research and a pilot program 
done in 2006 in conjunction with the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation.  
Tanzania. In Tanzania, a partnership has been developed with CRDB, a local bank responsible 
for most of the lending to coffee and cotton sectors (it has a portfolio of over USD 80 million) to 
implement a commodity price hedging program for borrowers. In 2005, in the first-ever such 
program initiated by a local African bank, CRDB established a commodity risk management 
unit. CRDB has a well-integrated system to support this operation that involves the Treasury 
department, which is responsible for booking financial risk management transactions with an 
overseas market provider (Rabobank in 2005/6) and relationship managers in the Corporate 
Client Department who are responsible for carrying out the risk assessment and risk 
management activities with clients (coffee producer groups and cotton ginning companies 
numbering between 25–35). The risk assessment tools provided to the banks’ borrowers and its 
staff have been integrated into standard business practices in Tanzania, although as mentioned 
above there is a need for additional capacity building to ensure greater take-up of these tools 
among the smaller and less sophisticated organizations. 
Currently the Bank is continuing to provide technical support to CRDB on a) improvements in 
the risk assessment tools to make them more user-friendly, b) structuring prototype risk 
management contracts, c) establishing distribution of bi-weekly market that gives cotton and 
coffee borrowers independent information about global prices, and d) creating operational 
guides and procedure manuals to ensure that permanent institutionalization of the program 
within the bank. 
Also in Tanzania, a new project is under development in cooperation with the Common Fund for 
Commodities to strengthen in country capacity on risk management in coffee and cotton 
sectors. This joint project will build on the initial work done to develop risk assessment tools 
which help coffee and cotton marketing organizations identify a) overall position against the 
market, b) break-even cost/price levels, and c) a mark-to-market value which demonstrates net 
profit/loss of the overall position against current market prices. Initial capacity building on this 
issue has started to change marketing behavior since producer groups and ginning companies 
who have adapted the tools are now able to monitor financial exposure throughout the season 
and make informed decisions about covering risk through forward selling, minimum price 
guarantee contracts, or financial options. In addition to improved risk management practices, 
the tools have helped strengthen the capacity of organizations to improve tracking of inventory, 
purchases, sales commitments, and quality/grades.  
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Currently, the risk assessment tools are being revised based on feedback from stakeholders.  
Although approximately 5–10 coffee producer groups and cotton ginning companies have 
implemented the new risk management practices, additional capacity building is needed to 
provide refresher training and reach the rest of the market which includes the 15–20 smaller or 
less sophisticated organizations.  
This work is supported by the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the Netherlands Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and the European Union. The EU’s All ACP Agricultural Commodities 
Programme will be supporting activities such as this, in collaboration with other partners. For 
more information on these activities please contact Julie Dana — jdana@worldbank.org. 
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Recent rises in food prices have captured global attention regarding the need to manage 
price risk. While price risk management mechanisms (i.e., forwards, futures, and 
options) can be very beneficial for short-term risks — year-to-year fluctuations — these 
mechanisms do not protect against long-term trends in commodity prices. To the extent 
that current price increases are due to a rise in global demand for food and oil, price risk 
mechanisms will be ineffective for managing this fundamental change. 
Price risk management mechanisms are most helpful for internationally traded 
commodities. For example, Malawi imports white maize when national yields are low; 
however, national yields are inversely correlated with the white maize price on the South 
Africa Exchange Market (SAFEX), so purchasing maize can be very costly when food 
shortages occur (Dana, Gilbert, and Shim, 2007). In 2005, Malawi purchased an OTC 
call option — based on the SAFEX price of white maize plus the cost of physical delivery 
— for food security purposes. During November and December of 2005, the price of 
white maize increased and Malawi used the call option and received physical settlement, 
which it used to address food shortages (Dana, 2007). Likewise, put options could be 
used to hedge risk for exported commodities. Still, several preconditions remain that limit 
the use of price risk management mechanisms in lower income countries. Specifically, 
effective price risk management typically requires that:  
1. The commodity is traded on international exchange markets; 
2. The domestic market is integrated with regional and/or international markets; and 
3. Local markets are well-integrated. 
Commodities not listed on exchange markets tend to trade in lower volumes and do not 
have standardized price risk management mechanisms (i.e., futures and options). OTC 
contracts and forwards contracts can be used, but are more challenging for low-volume 
commodities in lower income countries due to high transaction costs (e.g., pricing the 
risk, due diligence, etc.) and the problems associated with nonintegrated markets 
(Numbers 2 and 3 above). 
Domestic market integration with international markets seems to depend on a complex 
relationship among a variety of factors including tariffs, trade restrictions, agricultural 
subsidy policies, geography, and transport costs (Barrett, 2001). Integration with 
international markets may differ among countries within the same region in Africa. For 
example, coffee markets in Ethiopia and Uganda are integrated with international 
markets, but not in Rwanda due largely to government subsidies (Rapsominikis, Hallam, 
and Conforti, 2004).  
What may be even more problematic is that, in some African nations, local markets are 
not integrated. For example in Ethiopia, a surplus of maize resulting in lower prices may 
occur in one region while drought and food shortages result in higher maize prices in 
another (FEWS NET, 2006). When local markets are not integrated, households are 
more dependent on the commodities that they and other community members grow. For 
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example in Mozambique, rural households alter their consumption patterns from each 
season based on the availability of local commodities (e.g., substituting cassava in the 
lean season for maize in the harvest season); however, consumption patterns of urban 
households in Mozambique are more consistent largely because of access to imported 
wheat-based products (Handa and Mlay, 2006).  
Markets should integrate when: 
p1t – p2t  ≥ c 
That is the differences between prices at Market 1 at a single point in time (p1t ) and 
Market 2 at a single point in time (p2t ) are greater than or equal to the transaction costs 
(c), e.g., transporting the commodity (adapted from Rapsominikis, Hallam, and Conforti, 
2004). Two factors substantially increase transaction costs and are the primary 
constraints to market integration in Africa: transportation and communications 
infrastructure (Rapsominikis, Hallam, and Conforti, 2004). First, farmers cannot cost-
effectively move commodities if roads and bridges, but also trucks, trains, or other 
methods to transport crops, are unavailable or inadequate. In Mozambique, access to a 
road was associated with consumption of nonlocal commodities. Farm households that 
lived within 2 km of a road were less likely to change consumption patterns based on the 
local growing season than farm households that lived more than 2 km from a road 
(Handa and Mlay, 2006). Second, when communications infrastructure is inadequate, 
the transaction costs of collecting price information on other markets (e.g., by traveling to 
those markets) is likely higher than the expected profit from selling in another market. 
When local markets are not integrated, insuring against extreme weather events that 
dramatically decrease yields on the regional level may be an effective alternative for 
hedging against high local commodity prices. Price increases will often occur when 
yields are low in the region due to correlated losses (e.g., a weather event or pest). In 
regions where drought is a major risk and markets are not well-integrated, an index 
insurance contract purchased by the government or a donor that paid as a drought 
emerged could fund the costs of bringing food relief into the region. 
FEWS NET provides excellent resources on several African countries regarding regional 
livelihoods strategies. These reports illustrate the effects of market isolation and natural 
disasters on local livelihoods. The report on the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and 
People’s Region (SNNPR) in Ethiopia is over 250 pages and divides the region into 38 
livelihoods zones (FEWS NET, 2006). Understanding the effects of natural disasters at 
this level of detail is what is needed for safety nets to effectively protect vulnerable 
households from food and income shocks. 
 
 
